PrEP aring for a Challenge to Government-Owned Patents by Holland, Caleb
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 70 
Issue 3 Summer 2021 Article 11 
9-25-2021 
"PrEP"aring for a Challenge to Government-Owned Patents 
Caleb Holland 
Catholic University of America (Student), hollandcal@cua.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Caleb Holland, "PrEP"aring for a Challenge to Government-Owned Patents, 70 Cath. U. L. Rev. 493 (2021). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol70/iss3/11 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
"PrEP"aring for a Challenge to Government-Owned Patents 
Cover Page Footnote 
Caleb Holland is a J.D. graduate of The Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law with a 
background in health science, completing his B.S. in Biology and graduate certificate in Global Health at 
Old Dominion University. The author would like to thank Luis E. Zambrano Ramos for his advice and 
guidance, and the Catholic University Law Review for its invaluable support in editing this Comment. 
This comments is available in Catholic University Law Review: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol70/iss3/11 
 
 493 
“PREP”ARING FOR A CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT-
OWNED PATENTS 
Caleb A. Holland+ 
The word “patent” traces its origin to the Latin word “patere”—to be open.1  
Indeed, the underlying impact of a patent system is that it promulgates the open 
exchange of information to disseminate new ideas into the public sphere.2  The 
concept of a government-owned patent, however, can run contrary to this ideal. 
While the number of government-owned patents has waned in recent years, the 
United States Government was granted over 1,000 utility patents in 2019 alone.3  
Interestingly, despite owning such a prodigious patent estate, it surprisingly does 
not often sue for patent infringement.4  To understand why, it is necessary to 
understand the nature of an American patent — from its Constitutional origins, 
to judicial interpretations, and finally to modern statutory refinements.  In 
addition to understanding patents, one needs to have an appreciation of the 
unique status the United States government holds as an entity that both issues 
and owns patents.  Public policy norms and historical traditions have constrained 
much of what the government has chosen to do with its patents, but a recent 
confrontation between the Department of Health and Human Services and 
pharmaceutical company Gilead Sciences, Inc. is  challenging those norms and 
traditions.5  In refusing to accept a license for usage of the CDC-owned patent 
 
 + Caleb Holland is a J.D. graduate of The Catholic University of America Columbus School of 
Law with a background in health science, completing his B.S. in Biology and graduate certificate 
in Global Health at Old Dominion University.  The author would like to thank Luis E. Zambrano 
Ramos for his advice and guidance, and the Catholic University Law Review for its invaluable 
support in editing this Comment. 
 1. 1 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., PAT. L. FUNDAMENTALS § 1:1 (2d ed. 2020). 
 2. Effective Use of Government-Owned Rights to Inventions: Publication Versus Patenting, 
55 GEO. L. J. 1083, 1084 (1967) [hereinafter Publication Versus Patenting] (“The purpose of the 
patent laws is primarily to channel significant inventions swiftly into the mainstream of the 
economy.”). 
 3. See Captain Steven R. Fuscher, USAF, How the Government Obtains Patent Rights 
Under the ASPR and FPR Patent Rights Clauses – Part I: When Is the Government Entitled to 
Patent Rights?, 20 A.F.L. REV. 209, 209 (1978) (explaining that between 1970 and 1975 alone, the 
U.S. Government received 52,996 invention disclosures from approximately $100 billion dollars 
in research and development); see also U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Patenting by 
Organizations (Utility Patents) 2019, Part A1- Table A1-1b, Breakout by Ownership Category 
(2019). https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/topo_19.htm#PartA1_1b 
 4. See Thomas Lizzi, From Benevolent Administration to Government Employee Inventions, 
Human Genomes, and Exclusive Licensing: Is Governmental Ownership of Patents 
Constitutional?, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 299, 300–01 (1996). 
 5. Complaint at 3, United States v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 1:19-cv-02103-UNA (D. Del. filed 
Nov. 6, 2019). 
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for PrEP, Gilead could be testing the limits of what the government is willing to 
do with its patents. 
This Comment will examine the nature of government-owned patents and 
attempt to answer the question why the government has heretofore been reticent 
to exercise its patent rights against infringers.  Finally, this Comment will look 
specifically at the case of United States v. Gilead Sciences, Inc. and provide 
observations as to potential implications that could result from the suit, and 
ultimately will probe whether or not the federal government can or should take 
action when its patent rights are infringed. 
I.  BACKGROUND AND PRIOR LAW 
A.  The Origins of Patents in the United States 
One of the earliest known acquisitions of patent rights by the United States 
federal government dates back to 1812, with an Act of Congress that 
appropriated sixty thousand dollars for the purchase of technology related to the 
lighting of lighthouses.6  Since that time the government has acquired thousands 
of patents through similar modes of acquisition, as well as by acquiring rights 
and licenses through the theory of “shop right”7 and by directly filing for patents 
in its name on behalf of its employees.8  But what does the government do with 
its patent estate?  What can the government do with its patents?  To understand 
these questions, one must examine the nature of a patent right, as well as the 
different scenarios that could implicate the government’s patents. 
The ability to patent is so important to our society that its roots trace back to 
the Constitution.9  Congress was given the enumerated power to “promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries[.]”10  This clause is commonly known as the “Intellectual Property 
Clause.”11  Patents and copyrights as we know them in the United States are 
Congress’ way of exercising this Constitutional prerogative.12  It is helpful to 
understand that a patent is, at bottom, a contract between the patent-holder and 
 
 6. Act of March 2, 1812, ch. 34, 2 Stat. 691. 
 7. JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., PAT. L. BASICS § 12:10 (Nov. 2020) (explaining that 
“[t]he Supreme Court developed the concept of shop right as a form of equitable compensation for 
situations where the employer has financed an employee’s invention by providing wages, materials, 
tools, and a work place.”). 
 8. See Lizzi, supra note 4, at 305–06. 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 10. Id. 
 11. David L. Lange, The Intellectual Property Clause in Contemporary Trademark Law: An 
Appreciation of Two Recent Essays and Some Thoughts About Why We Ought to Care, 59 SPG L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 213, 213 (1996); see also Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1001 (2020). 
 12. Publication Versus Patenting, supra note 2, at 1084. 
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the government.13  In exchange for the rights attendant to owning a patent, the 
inventor must disclose information to the public.14  Therefore, while securing to 
inventors the ability to profit from their achievements is certainly a collateral 
effect of patents—and additionally incentivizes the patenting of new inventions 
and discoveries—it is arguably not the primary purpose of a patent. 15  
Ultimately, society is the key benefactor of patents; new information begets new 
discovery and, therefore, society progresses. 
Patents have been described as limited monopolies,16 but this definition does 
not take into account the appropriate nuance of patents.  While patents are 
traditionally viewed as property, they do not fall neatly within the paradigm of 
either real or personal property.17  The key to understanding this is to recognize 
that the essential element of a patent is the property right of exclusion.18  To 
illustrate, assume that one invents, uses, and markets a new product.  That 
inventor did not need a patent to grant them the ability to invent, use, or market 
that product.  In fact, one cannot even obtain a patent until the product has itself 
been sufficiently realized to qualify for the patent.19  Instead, obtaining a patent 
provides the patent-holder with the critical right to prevent (i.e., exclude) others 
from making and marketing the same invention.20  Therefore, owning a patent 
does not actually grant the patent-holder the “positive” rights to create and use, 
but rather the “negative” right to exclude others from making the same 
invention.21  This exclusionary right seems, on some level, to be at odds with 
“promot[ing] the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts.”22  However, this is 
reconciled when viewed in light of the way patents function overall to bring forth 
new information into the public consciousness. 
Philosophical distinctions notwithstanding, patents have common elements 
that have been outlined by statute.23  While the intricacies of patent law are 
numerous and generally beyond the scope of this article, it is still useful to have 
a basic understanding of these fundamental elements.  Inventions are patent-
eligible if they fall into at least one of four categories: “processes or methods; 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Lizzi, supra note 4, at 302 (citing PETER D. ROSENBURG, PAT. L. BASICS §1.03 
(1993)). 
 17. Sean M. O’Connor, Taking, Tort, or Crown Right?: The Confused Early History of 
Government Patent Policy, 12 JOHN MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 145, 146 (2012). 
 18. Id. at 147. 
 19. Lizzi, supra note 4, at 303–04 (providing the requirements of patentability). 
 20. Publication Versus Patenting, supra note 2, at 1084–85 (“The most active use of a patent 
occurs through the exercise of . . . exclud[ing] others from making, using, or selling the invention.”). 
 21. O’Connor, supra note 17, at 147. 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. 
 23. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
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[]machines or apparatuses; []manufactures; and []compositions of matter.” 24  
Within these categories, patent applications must satisfy the statutory conditions 
of utility, novelty, and non-obviousness of the subject matter.25  The Supreme 
Court has carved out three exceptions to patentability: laws of nature; physical 
phenomena; and abstract ideas.26  The patents examined later in this Comment 
are presumed valid for the sake of argument. 
B.  Patents vs. Copyrights 
Notably lacking in the above-mentioned history and purpose of patents is the 
ability, right, or authority of the government to grant patents to itself or to 
otherwise acquire patent rights.  In fact, a significant number of commenters 
have suggested that there is no constitutional basis for the government to own 
patents at all.27  This quirk of the law is even more puzzling considering that 
government ownership of the other part of the intellectual property clause – 
copyrights – has been thoroughly examined and addressed by United States 
 
 24. Elizabeth D. Lauzon, Annotation, Patentability Under 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 Which Excludes 
Laws of Nature, Physical Phenomena, and Abstract Ideas, 5 A.L.R. Fed. 3d. Art. 4 § 2 (2015) 
(ALR is updated weekly). 
 25. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103. § 103 states: 
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed 
invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between 
the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole 
would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a 
person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. 
Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made. 
35 U.S.C. §103. See generally, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., General Information Concerning 
Patents, (Oct. 2015), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-
concerning-patents. 
 26. Because “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are ‘the basic tools of 
scientific and technological work[,]’” the Supreme Court has expressed concern that monopolizing 
these tools by granting patent rights may impede innovation rather than promote it.  Alice Corp. 
Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).  See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. 
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71(2012).  However, the Court has also emphasized that an 
invention is not considered to be ineligible for patenting simply because it involves an abstract 
concept.  Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981)); see 
also Thales Visionix, Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“That a 
mathematical equation is required to complete the claimed method and system does not doom the 
claims to abstraction.”).  Accordingly, the Court has said that an application of an abstract idea, law 
of nature, or natural phenomenon may be eligible for patent protection.  Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 
217 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).  U. S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 2106 
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility [R-10.2019], https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/
s2106.html. 
 27. See Publication Versus Patenting, supra note 2, at 1088; Frank J. Willie, Government 
Ownership of Patents, 12 FORDHAM L. REV. 105, 111 (1943); see generally Lizzi, supra note 4, at 
299. 
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law.28  As a matter of public policy, the government has, originally through 
judicial decision and eventually through statutory enactment, determined that 
there must be some restriction on ownership of copyrights in government 
publications.29  In sum, the courts found that because “such material as the laws 
and governmental rules and decisions must be freely available to the public and 
made known as widely as possible . . . there must be no restriction on the 
reproduction and dissemination of such documents.” 30   In regard to state 
government documents, the courts determined that while statutes and decisions 
were not eligible for copyright, the added material such as “headnotes, syllabi, 
annotations, indexes, etc.” was deemed eligible. 31  The courts did not have 
occasion to determine whether copyright eligibility also applied to the federal 
government.32  This idea of a distinction between government related documents 
that were and were not copyrightable has been referred to as the “public policy 
rule”33 which essentially means that government publications were not eligible 
for copyright.34  Congress first codified this position with the Printing Act of 
1895.35  Today, the prohibition still exists as a provision of the Copyright Act of 
1976,36 codified in Title 17 of the United States Code.37  The end result of this 
policy is that, with few exceptions,38 nearly anyone may copy, disseminate, or 
otherwise use documents or data produced by federal agencies, with no need for 
a license, notice, or royalties.39 
What is important to note about the government’s position on copyrights is 
that the branches of government recognized early in our nation’s history that 
public policy demanded limitations on the government’s use of the intellectual 
property clause of the Constitution.  Government-owned patents, on the other 
 
 28. See generally STAFF OF S. COMM. ON PAT., TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, 86TH 
CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, 
TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHT IN GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS 27 (Comm. Print 1961). 
 29. Id. at 27.  See also 17 U.S.C. § 105(a) (“Copyright protection under this title is not 
available for any work of the United States Government . . . .”) 
 30. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON PAT., TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, 86TH CONG., 
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, 
TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHT IN GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS 27 (Comm. Print 1961). 
 31. Id. at 28. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 29. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Robert M. Gellman, Twin Evils: Government Copyright and Copyright-Like Controls 
Over Government Information, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 999, 1024–25 (1995). 
 37. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (“Copyright protection under this title is not available for any work of 
the United States Government, but the United States Government is not precluded from receiving 
and holding copyrights transferred to it by assignment, bequest, or otherwise.”). 
 38. For exceptions, see e.g. 15 U.S.C. § 290e; U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, INTRODUCTION TO 
THE THIRD EDITION OF THE COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES 30–31(3d ed. 
2017). 
 39. See Gellman, supra note 36, at 1026. 
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hand, did not receive such attention.  One possible explanation for this is that, 
while not mandated by statute, the traditional policy of the United States has 
been to issue an applicant a non-exclusive, royalty-free license to a patent if 
requested.40  It has been speculated that this benign position has resulted in a 
lack of challenges to government patent ownership.41 
C.  What Does the Government Patent, and How Does it do it? 
The United States spends significant amounts of tax-payer dollars on research 
and development in various industries and fields of study.  The most recently 
available data at the time of writing indicates that the United States government 
spent over 580 billion dollars on these endeavors in 2018 alone.42  Some of the 
earliest examples of government patent ownership relate to war-related 
technology.43  Indeed, even today the majority of research and development 
spending is devoted to national defense, with health, space, general science, 
energy, agriculture, and national resources & environment constituting the 
remainder. 44   The fruit of this research is often patented in some form or 
another.45  It is not surprising, therefore, that the government is consistently one 
of the largest patent holders in the United States.46 
Appreciating the role of research and development in government patents is 
critical for the purposes of this Comment because it directly precipitated the two 
main theories that exist today regarding government-owned patents. 47   The 
debate over the government’s role in patenting government-financed inventions 
traces back to the 1800s.48  However, the significance of this debate certainly 
grew in proportion to the substantial increase in government spending on 
research and development during and after the Second World War.49 
 
 40. Publication Versus Patenting, supra note 2, at 1091. 
 41. Lizzi, supra note 4, at 299.  It is also worth noting that issues surrounding copyrights are 
tangential to free speech issues, which is another possible reason why copyrights have been given 
more attention than patents.  Further, it is possible that copyrights had to be dealt with because of 
the universal need for citizens to be aware of the law.  No such universal need exists with patents, 
which could also explain why copyrights have been restricted differently than patents. 
 42. JOHN F. SARGENT, JR., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44307, U.S. RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT FUNDING AND PERFORMANCE: FACT SHEET (2020). 
 43. O’Connor, supra note 17, at 154–55 (In 1836, Congress authorized the purchase of two 
patents from Captain William H. Bell, both relating to cannon technology.  In 1846, Congress 
authorized the purchase of a machine called a “manger stopper” for “all ships of war or other vessels 
belonging to the United States”). 
 44. Sargent, supra note 42, at 2. 
 45. Publication Versus Patenting, supra note 2, at 1083. 
 46. See supra note 3. 
 47. Josh Lerner, Patent Policy Innovations: A Clinical Examination, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1841, 
1852 (2000). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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D.  How the Government Acquires Patent Rights 
Patents are statutorily treated as personal property.50  This includes the right 
of assignment and the ability to grant and convey, in whole or in part, any interest 
in a patent to the United States government.51  While the government may utilize 
one of these methods to acquire patent rights, perhaps the most common method 
of attainment is through inventions developed by its employees.52  The concept 
of “shop right” is a common law doctrine developed by the United States 
Supreme Court, which provides that when an employer has provided the 
means—i.e., tools, materials, wages, etc.—for developing an invention, that 
employer is entitled to some form of equitable compensation. 53   That 
“compensation” is usually manifested as a vested right to an “irrevocable, 
equitable license to use the invention.”54  Shop right has been extended to the 
federal government.55  It is important to note that a shop right is not by definition 
confined to the employee-employer relationship; the full nature of the 
relationship considering all facts and circumstances are taken into account to 
determine the existence of a shop right.56 
Aside from shop right, there are other ways under common law that an 
employer can come to own or at least rightfully use an employee’s patent.57  The 
baseline assumption is that the rights to an invention belong to the inventor, and 
“[a]bsent an agreement to the contrary, an employer does not have rights in an 
invention ‘which is the original conception of the employee alone.’”58  This is 
premised on the fact that “original conception” excludes the usage of an 
employer’s resources; in other words, if an employer provided the necessary 
means to bring an invention to fruition, they facilitated the invention in such a 
way as to preclude a finding of “original conception of the employee alone.”59  
In these instances, the employer is entitled to an irrevocable, royalty-free 
license.60  Two other common exceptions exist to the general rule, which says 
 
 50. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (“Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes 
of personal property.”). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Lizzi, supra note 4, at 305. 
 53. MILLS III ET AL., supra note 7. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Lizzi, supra note 4, at 305 (citing United States v. Dubilier Condensor Corp., 289 U.S. 
178 (1933) stating that the federal government has the common law right, i.e. shop right, to an 
employee’s inventions). 
 56. Id. at 304. 
 57. See Paul Spiel, Express Employee Patent Assignments: Staying True to Intellectual 
Property’s Credo of Rewarding Innovation, 99 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 79, 84 (2017). 
 58. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stan. Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776, 
777 (2011) (explaining that “[s]ince 1790, patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an 
invention belong to the inventor.”). 
 59. See Spiel, supra note 57, at 84. 
 60. MILLS III ET AL., supra note 7. 
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that inventors own their inventions.61  These include an express contract, in 
which consideration would be paid to the inventor in return for the invention, 
and, relatedly, in the circumstance where an employee has been hired to exercise 
his “inventive faculties” for a specific project.62 
As noted above, the common law doctrine of shop right extends to the federal 
government as an employer.63  However, a combination of executive orders and 
statutory enactments laid the groundwork for the current paradigm of how the 
government handles inventions by its employees.64  Two reports, commissioned 
by President Franklin Roosevelt shortly after the start of the Second World War, 
articulate the debate.65  The first report, created by the National Patent Planning 
Commission (the “Commission”), recognized that the traditional position of the 
government was to issue non-exclusive, royalty-free licenses stemming from 
patents held by non-defense agencies. 66   The report noted that some 
government-owned patents should be commercialized and made available to the 
public; however, the policy of freely granting licenses acted as an impediment 
to that commercialization. 67   The Commission believed that, if substantial 
capital and investment were required on the part of a private business, that 
business would be less likely to incur those expenses if they could not be 
guaranteed the commercial advantage of an exclusive license. 68   The 
Commission’s recommendation was not to fully endorse granting exclusive 
licenses, but to posit that licensing practices should be allowed to vary among 
the different government agencies.69  This selective granting of licenses has far 
reaching implications, which will be discussed further in the Comment. 
A second report by the Department of Justice argued that exclusive licenses 
should be forbidden, except in extraordinary circumstances. 70   The report 
pointed out that innovations funded by the public should be for the benefit of the 
public.71  If a license was granted which created a purely private monopoly, the 
public could be asked to pay for—or even be denied access to—technology 
which was already publicly funded. 72   Three years after the release of the 
Department of Justice report, in 1950, President Truman issued Executive Order 
 
 61. See Spiel, supra note 57, at 84. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Lizzi, supra note 4, at 305. 
 64. Id. at 299. 
 65. Lerner, supra note 47, at 1852–53 (citing H.R. Doc. No. 79-22 (1945)). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1853. 
 68. H.R. Doc. No. 79-22, at 5–6 (1945). 
 69. Id. at 7. 
 70. Lerner, supra note 47, at 1853. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
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10096.73  The Order established new policy that called for the government to 
obtain: 
[T]he entire right, title and interest in and to all inventions made by 
any Government employee (1) during working hours, or (2) with a 
contribution by the Government of facilities, equipment, materials, 
funds, or information, or of time or services of other Government 
employees on official duty, or (3) which bear a direct relation to or are 
made in consequence of the official duties of the inventor.74 
Importantly, under this Order the government reserved the right to grant 
licenses “for all governmental purposes.” 75   While statistical analysis of 
licensing government patents in the immediate aftermath of this Order is lacking, 
commenters have noted that the frequency of awarding exclusive licenses to 
contractors and government employees is perhaps higher than would be 
expected given the recommendations of the Commission and Department of 
Justice reports.76 
Congress has worked to strike a balance between encouraging innovation and 
protecting government rights.  The Bayh-Doyle Act, passed in 1980, gave small 
businesses and nonprofit organizations, including universities, the right to patent 
inventions made with federal funds.77  Section 200 of Title 35 of the United 
States Code says, in part, “[i]t is the policy and objective of the Congress to use 
the patent system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally 
supported research or development . . .” and “to ensure that the Government 
obtains sufficient rights in federally supported inventions to meet the needs of 
the Government and protect the public against nonuse or unreasonable use of 
inventions . . . .”78  Another example of Congress applying statutory conditions 
on the patent system can be found in the Invention Secrecy Act.79  As noted 
above, a significant portion of patents are in the realm of national defense.  
Unsurprisingly, some of the information and discoveries contained in those 
patents could be damaging to national security were it to enter into the wrong 
hands.  Congress passed the Invention Secrecy Act of 1951 to allow the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) the ability to order certain 
inventions be kept secret.80  As patent applications are reviewed upon initial 
receipt at the USPTO, the Commissioner of Patents can order that the invention 
be kept secret if it is determined that publication or disclosure of the invention 
 
 73. Exec. Order No. 10096, 3 C.F.R. 76–78 (1950). 
 74. Id. at 76. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Lerner, supra note 47, at 1853. 
 77. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3018 (1980) (codified as 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–
206). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Invention Secrecy Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 181–88. 
 80. James Maune, Patent Secrecy Orders: Fairness Issues in Application of Invention of 
Secrecy Act, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J.  471, 472 (2012). 
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(i.e., granting a patent for the invention) “would be detrimental to national 
security.”81  As of 2010, over 5,000 United States patents were subject to a 
secrecy order in some form.82  In this we see an example of Congress bending 
the overall policy goal of the patent system — promoting progress of science 
and useful arts — to yield to a different goal of protecting national security. 
E.  Relationship Between the Federal Government and Patent Infringement 
Patent infringement is the equivalent of a violation of one’s right to exclude.  
When a private party seeks remedy for patent infringement by another private 
party, several options are available.83  These include money damages, including 
royalties and interest, and an injunction.84  Are these same remedies available 
when the government is a party in the infringement action?  Is the answer 
different depending on if the government is a plaintiff or a defendant? 
An infringement of rights is an action in tort, rather than in property. 85  
However, as stated above, patent rights do have qualities of real and personal 
property.86  It follows, then, that if the government infringes on a privately-
owned patent, and subsequently renders the only meaningful component of a 
patent—the right to exclude—meaningless, this is effectively a taking under the 
Fifth Amendment. 87   Still, courts in the United States have ruled that 
government infringement of patents is not a “taking” because of 14 U.S.C. § 
1498, something commonly referred to as the “Government Use Statute.”88  This 
statute provides that the only remedy patent-holders may seek against the 
government will be fair compensation in the Court of Federal Claims.89  Prior to 
this statute, the status of remedies for government infringement was murky: 
patent grants were not truly established as property rights until 1870 in the 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Lizzi, supra note 4, at 304–05. 
 84. Id. 
 85. O’Connor, supra note 17, at 146–47. 
 86. See infra Sec. I. 
 87. O’Connor, supra note 17,  at 151. 
 88. Id. 
 89. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (providing that “[w]henever an invention described in and covered 
by a patent of the United States is used or manufactured by or for the United States without license 
. . . the owner’s remedy shall be by action against the United States in the United States Court of 
Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use and 
manufacture.”). 
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Supreme Court case of Seymour v. Osborne, 90  and sovereign immunity 
precluded suit against the United States, absent consent from Congress.91 
The “Government Use Statute” tracks closely with the English doctrine of 
“Crown Right,” which allows the British Government to practice any patent that 
it grants.92  A key difference, however, is that the Government Use Statute 
requires fair compensation, whereas Crown Right does not.93  For this reason, 
the Supreme Court has consistently rejected Crown Right in the United States.94  
An 1878 decision by the United States Court of Claims is enlightening in this 
regard, as it pointed out that the United States did not view patents as favors or 
privileges that can be granted or withdrawn on the whim of a sovereign, but 
rather as rights to be secured with the attendant condition of just compensation 
for unjust appropriation.95  The first case brought against the United States for 
patent infringement was the case of Pitcher v. United States in 1863, but that 
case was ultimately unsuccessful due to lack of jurisdiction.96 
Today, significant debate persists over the government as an actor in the 
patent system.  The overall landscape is much clearer today than it was in 1863, 
but government patent policy in general is still very much evolving.97  Key to 
this Comment is the fact that there are virtually no cases in which the 
government has sued a private actor for infringement of a government-owned 
patent, particularly in the pharmaceutical context. 98   One extremely rare 
exception can be found in a case brought before the United States International 
 
 90. Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516, 533 (1870) (stating “inventions secured by letters 
patent are property in the holder of the patent, and as such are as much entitled to protection as any 
other property, consisting of a franchise, during the term for which the franchise or the exclusive 
right is granted.”). 
 91. See, e.g., Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 166 (1894) (stating “[t]he United 
States cannot be sued in their courts without their consent”). 
 92. O’Connor, supra note 17, at 151. 
 93. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). 
 94. O’Connor, supra note 17, at 152. 
 95. Id. at 164 (quoting McKeever v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 396, 421 (1878)). 
 96. Id. at 156–57 (citing Pitcher v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 7 (1863)).  In sum, the case was 
over a machine utilized by a prison warden to have inmates manufacture brooms.  At the time, 
patent infringement was treated as a tort, and the United States could not be sued for tortious acts.  
Pitcher attempted other arguments based on the Takings Clause and a theory of implied contract, 
but the court was unpersuaded.  Id. 
 97. Id. at 204 (explaining that several nuances and unresolved issues still exist in government 
patent policy). 
 98. Christopher Rowland, An HIV Treatment Cost Taxpayers Millions. The Government 
Patented it.  But a Pharma Giant is Making Billions., WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/pharma-giant-profits-from-hiv-treatment-
funded-by-taxpayers-and-patented-by-the-government/2019/03/26/cee5afb4-40fc-11e9-9361-
301ffb5bd5e6_story.html (explaining that the current standoff between the CDC and Gilead is 
“extraordinary” and that intellectual-property disputes between the government and private 
pharmaceutical companies are rare). 
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Trade Commission (“ITC”) in 1984.99  There, the ITC, on its own motion, 
instituted an investigation to determine if certain Swedish and American 
companies had violated Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 by importing 
products that infringed on patents owned by the Department of Agriculture.100  
A split Commission recommended that the investigation be terminated on a 
technicality, and thus the case was never decided.101  However, even if this case 
had been decided on the merits and found in favor of the government, the 
primary remedy available to the ITC is to direct Customs to stop any products 
from coming into the country.102  Whether or not this would have resulted in 
significant implications to the patent system is unclear. 
F.  Constitutional Infirmity of Government Owned Patents 
To fully understand the footing of the government when it comes to what it 
can and cannot do with its patents, it is helpful to understand the constitutional 
arguments against government ownership of patents in the first place.  As stated 
above, patents are contracts with the government.103  For the “consideration” of 
public disclosure of an invention, the government grants the patent-owner the 
right to exclude others from making that invention for a limited time. 104  
 
 99. Certain Apparatus for Flow Injection Analysis & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-
151, USITC Pub. (Nov. 1984) (Final). 
 100. Id. at *1, *4.  The ITC is one of the few places where patent challenges can be heard.  
About Unfair Import Investigations, USITC, https://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property/about_
section_337.htm (last visited January 11, 2021).  According to the ITC website: 
Unfair import (a.k.a Section 337) investigations conducted by the U.S. International 
Trade Commission most often involve claims regarding intellectual property rights, 
including allegations of patent infringement and trademark infringement by imported 
goods.  Both utility and design patents, as well as registered and common law trademarks, 
may be asserted in these investigations.  Other forms of unfair competition involving 
imported products, such as infringement of registered copyrights, mask works or boat 
hull designs, misappropriation of trade secrets or trade dress, passing off, and false 
advertising, may also be asserted. 
Id.  This provision essentially states that importation of goods into the United States using unfair 
trade practices are unlawful.  19 U.S.C. § 1337(a). 
 101. Certain Apparatus for Flow Injection Analysis & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-
151, USITC Pub. at *4 (Nov. 1984) (Final) (finding that the investigation had to be vacated because 
the investigation was based on the original claims and the claims of the reexamined patent did not 
match the claims in the original patent). 
 102. About Unfair Import Investigations, supra note 100. The key here is to note that the ITC 
has limited enforcement capabilities: “The primary remedy available in Section 337 investigations 
is an exclusion order that directs Customs to stop infringing imports from entering the United 
States.  In addition, the Commission may issue cease and desist orders against named importers 
and other persons engaged in unfair acts that violate Section 337.  Expedited relief in the form of 
temporary exclusion orders and temporary cease and desist orders may also be available in certain 
exceptional circumstances.” 
 103. See Publication Versus Patenting, supra note 2, at 1084. 
 104. Lizzi, supra note 4, at 302–03. 
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Therefore, to best serve the public policy goal behind granting patents, it follows 
that the disclosure be made available to the public as soon as possible.105 
If the government becomes the party to which that right is granted, that 
relationship reduces to one party: the government has now made a contract with 
itself. 106   This implicates a myriad of issues of contract law, including the 
sovereign merger doctrine, which essentially states that if a right issued by a 
sovereign returns to the sovereign it is extinguished.107  In other words, “the 
patent becomes a nullity by the very incidence of governmental ownership.”108 
Even if we assume that the patents are legally valid, credible arguments can 
be made that the government having the power to exclude (i.e., the essential right 
bestowed upon a patent holder) does not serve the public policy interest of the 
patent system envisioned by the Framers.109  First, the purpose behind granting 
a right to exclude is to reward and incentivize inventors to invent new things.110  
The government already has a Constitutional mandate to spend money for the 
public good, so this incentive is largely irrelevant to the government as a patent 
holder.111  Second, the sheer size and resources of the government apparatus 
may have the effect of stifling innovation from private companies who do not 
wish to compete with the government in acquiring or utilizing a contested 
patent.112  Finally, the government exercising ownership of patents can have the 
effect of restricting or removing information from the public domain, limiting 
free access to information that was paid for with public funds.113 
 
 105. Willie, supra note 27, at 106.  (“Public policy would seem compellingly to require that an 
invention, as soon as it is made and disclosed, should be available to the public.”). Id. 
 106. Lizzi, supra note 4, at 317–18 (explaining five reasons based on contract law principles 
why government-owned patents are unconstitutional: (1) there must be two parties to a contract; 
(2) “contract merger doctrine,” which states that if the “promise returns to the hands of the promisor 
. . . the contract is extinguished”; (3) “the federal government lacks the capacity to” make a valid 
patent contract “of its own issue”; (4) unenforceability of illegal contracts, i.e., that the Intellectual 
Property Clause disallows government patent ownership and thus any such patent would be a 
contract for an illegal purpose; (5) sovereign grant merger doctrine, i.e. the patent “is void because 
the patent rights are extinguished upon their return to the hands of the sovereign which issued them 
and cannot constitute the valuable consideration necessary to sustain a valid contract.”). 
 107. Id. at 316 (The idea of sovereign merger was spoken about by a former Commissioner of 
Patents as early as 1928 and was traced back to Thomas Paine). 
 108. Lizzi, supra note 4, at 316. 
 109. Id. at 312 (explaining that government ownership of patents inhibits the “progress of the 
useful arts” in several significant ways); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (“Except as otherwise provided 
in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, 
within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term 
of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”). 
 110. Lizzi, supra note 4, at 312. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 312–13. 
 113. Id. at 313–14. 
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G.  Case Study: PrEP, Truvada, Gilead, and DHHS. 
Amid the recent furor over high prescription drug prices in the United States, 
one drug in particular has been highlighted by advocacy groups pushing for 
reform.114  Truvada is a medication manufactured by pharmaceutical company 
Gilead Sciences, Inc.115  Truvada is the brand name for a single pill that contains 
two medications: 300 mg of TDF (tenofovir disoproxil fumarate) and 200 mg of 
FTC (emtricitabine).116  TDF and FTC are drugs used to treat persons infected 
with HIV to prevent the development of AIDS (acquired immunodeficiency 
syndrome).117  Truvada was approved by the FDA in 2004 for HIV treatment, 
but recently has been used not only to treat persons with HIV, but also as a 
prophylactic drug that can prevent new HIV infections.118  This concept has 
been called pre-exposure prophylaxis, or “PrEP”.119  The need for such a drug 
cannot be understated.  Globally, almost 38 million people are living with HIV 
with 1.7 million individuals newly infected in 2018 alone.120  In the United 
States, roughly 1.2 million people live with HIV and approximately 14 percent 
(one in seven) of those do not know that they are infected. 121   Since the 
beginnings of the epidemic in the early 1980s, over 700,000 people have died 
from AIDS in the United States.122   The first drug approved by the FDA for 
treating AIDS came in 1987, with a drug known as azidothymidine (AZT).123  
However, HIV replicates quickly, and mutations in the virus led to 
pharmaceutical resistance. 124   Over the next several years, numerous 
medications were developed which eventually led to the advent of combination 
therapy, which allowed for durable suppression of HIV to undetectable levels 
 
 114. Rowland, supra note 98. 
 115. Drug Database: Emtricitabine / Tenofovir Disoproxil Fumarate, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH 
& HUMAN SERVS. (Feb. 10, 2020) https://clinicalinfo.hiv.gov/en/drugs/emtricitabine-tenofovir-
disoproxil-fumarate/patient. 
 116. See supra note 115. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id.  See also U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Drug Approval Package, TRUVADA 
(Emtricitabine and Tenofovir Disoproxil Fumarate) Tablets, 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2004/021752s000_TruvadaTOC.cfm. 
 119. Id. 
 120. HIV Basics: Overview: Data & Trends: U.S. Statistics, DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. 
(June 30, 2020), https://www.hiv.gov/hiv-basics/overview/data-and-trends/global-statistics. 
 121. Id. 
 122. The HIV/AIDS Epidemic in the United States: The Basics, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 
25, 2019), https://www.kff.org/hivaids/fact-sheet/the-hivaids-epidemic-in-the-united-states-the-
basics/. 
 123. Antiretroviral Drug Discovery and Development, NAT’L INST. OF ALLERGY AND 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.niaid.nih.gov/diseases-conditions/
antiretroviral-drug-development. 
 124. See generally Stanford University HIV Drug Resistance Database, Primer on HIV 
Resistance (last updated Sept. 23, 1999), https://hivdb.stanford.edu/pages/documentPage/
primer.html 
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by using two or three drugs simultaneously.125  One of those drugs is Truvada, 
which was approved by the FDA in 2004 for the treatment of HIV.126  By and 
through a series of experiments conducted by the CDC in the mid-2000s, it was 
discovered that the components of Truvada were effective at preventing HIV 
infection.127  Based on those CDC studies, Gilead received approval from the 
FDA in 2012 to sell Truvada as a PrEP regimen.128  PrEP is remarkably effective 
at preventing HIV transmission from sex and injection drug use: when taken 
consistently, PrEP reduces the risk of HIV infection from sex by 99%, and by at 
least 74% from injection drug use.129  The potential impact on the spread of HIV 
is enormous, and in fact has already been documented in other countries.  For 
example, Australia introduced a program of government-funded Truvada/PrEP 
for high-risk Australian men in New South Wales, and experienced a twenty-
five percent drop in new HIV diagnoses in just one year — reaching the lowest 
number of new diagnoses in the area since recording began in 1985. 130  
According to Gilead’s sales reports, sales of HIV and HBV products (including 
Truvada’s newer version, Descovy) topped $14.2 billion in 2017 alone, 
representing a significant portion of Gilead’s total product revenue for the year 
. 131   The current monthly cost for a daily supply of Truvada approaches 
$2,000.132  This represents a 45% increase since Truvada was first approved for 
PrEP in 2012.133  Reports indicate that these same pills cost only $6 per month 
outside of the United Sates.134 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. FDA in Brief: FDA continues to encourage ongoing education about the benefits and 
risks associated with PrEP, including additional steps to help reduce the risk of getting HIV, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (July 1, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/fda-brief/fda-brief-fda-
continues-encourage-ongoing-education-about-benefits-and-risks-associated-prep. 
 127. Complaint at 1, United States v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 1:19-cv-02103-UNA (D. Del. filed 
Nov. 6, 2019). 
 128. Truvada FDA Approval History, DRUGS.COM, https://www.drugs.com/history/truvada.
html (last visited Mar. 7, 2021). 
 129. PrEP Effectiveness, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
hiv/basics/prep/prep-effectiveness.html (last updated Nov. 3, 2020). 
 130. Nina Avramova, PrEP can ‘significantly’ reduce HIV rates across populations, study 
says, CNN (Oct. 17, 2018, 3:00 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/17/health/hiv-reduction-men-
prep-australia-intl-study/index.html. 
 131. Press Release, Gilead, Gilead Sciences Announces Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2017 
Financial Results (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.gilead.com/news-and-press/press-room/press-
releases/2018/2/gilead-sciences-announces-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-2017-financial-results. 
 132. Shefali Luthra & Anna Gorman, Rising Cost of PrEP to Prevent HIV Infection Pushes it 
Out of Reach for Many, NPR (June 30, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2018/06/30/624045995/rising-cost-of-prep-a-pill-that-prevents-hiv-pushes-it-out-of-reach-
for-many. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See GHJP Joins PrEP4All in Calling on CDC to Use Its Patents for PrEP, YLS TODAY 
(Mar. 27, 2019), https://law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/ghjp-joins-prep4all-calling-cdc-use-its-
patents-prep. 
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H.  Patent Conflicts Between the United States and Gilead 
The United States has recently filed a civil suit against Gilead under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271 et seq. for infringement of four patents held by the CDC. 135   The 
government contends that these patents collectively represent the CDC’s 
groundbreaking work in discovering PrEP, i.e., that a combination of TDF and 
FTC (i.e., Truvada) could be taken to prevent HIV infection.136  It is undisputed 
that Gilead developed Truvada, i.e., the combination of TDF and FTC into a 
single pill.137  The issue in the suit is over the fact that Gilead markets and sells 
Truvada as a medication for PrEP, which (allegedly) violates the patents held by 
the CDC.138  The CDC claims that it has repeatedly tried to work with Gilead to 
develop a licensing agreement whereby Gilead can market Truvada as PrEP for 
a reasonable licensing fee.139  Not only has Gilead refused to enter into such an 
agreement, but they assert that the CDC’s patents are invalid.140  While no court 
or review board has yet made such a determination, industry commenters have 
evaluated the patents and found no reason to believe that, if subjected to legal 
challenge, the patents in question would be found invalid.141  This Comment will 
assume for the purposes of the overarching argument relating to government 
usage of government-held patents that the patents would be held valid. 
Gilead’s patent on pharmaceutical combinations of TDF and FTC (i.e., 
Truvada) runs through 2021, and as such there is no currently available generic 
in the United States market.142  Outside of the United States, however, one 
company sells generic equivalents in several countries including “Canada, 
Germany, France, Australia, and the United Kingdom[.]”143  As further evidence 
that a challenge to the CDC’s patents would be unsuccessful, a challenge was 
made by generic drug manufacturer Mylan to the international counterpart to the 
 
 135. Complaint at 3, United States v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 1:19-cv-02103-UNA (D. Del. filed 
Nov. 6, 2019) (The four patents are U.S. Patent Nos. 9,044,509, 9,579,333, 9,937,191, and 
10,335,423.  The patents are referred to collectively as “the Patents-in-Suit”). 
 136. Id. at 1. 
 137. Id. at 10. 
 138. Id. at 2–3. 
 139. Id. at 57–59. 
 140. Eric Sagonowsky, Gilead loses first PrEP patent challenge but vows to defend against 
HHS lawsuit, FIERCEPHARMA (Feb. 7, 2020, 8:35 AM), https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/
gilead-loses-first-prep-patent-challenge-but-vows-to-defend-against-hhs-lawsuit. 
 141. Christopher Morten, Statement on CDC’s Patents for PrEP, YALE GLOB. HEALTH JUST. 
P’SHIP 2 (Mar. 12, 2019), https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/ghjp/documents/ghjp
mortenstatement.pdf. 
 142. Gilead recently announced it had struck a deal with generic drug maker Teva to bring a 
generic Truvada to market one year ahead of schedule, at some time in 2020.  As of the time of this 
writing no generic is yet available in the United States market.  See Richard Morgan, HIV 
prevention drugs illustrate just how bad pharmaceutical patents are for our health, NBC NEWS 
(Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/hiv-prevention-drugs-illustrate-just-how-
bad-pharmaceutical-patents-are-ncna1249428. 
 143. Complaint at 56, United States v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 1:19-cv-02103-UNA (D. Del. 
filed Nov. 6, 2019). 
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CDC’s patents-in-suit before the European Patent Office. 144   The CDC’s 
European patent survived the challenge and is still in force today.145  As a result, 
Mylan entered into a settlement agreement with the CDC and agreed to pay the 
CDC royalties.146  Another pharmaceutical manufacturer, TAD Pharma GmbH, 
has taken a similar license “to sell a generic equivalent to Truvada for PrEP in 
Germany.” 147   The details of these settlement licensing agreements are not 
known, but the payment amounts collected from Mylan have been described as 
“small.”148  Still, advocacy groups point out that the CDC extracting licensing 
fees from foreign manufacturers makes a low-cost generic drug more expensive 
in countries abroad. 149   This is particularly unpalatable given that the only 
manufacturer allowed to sell to American consumers is, as of now, not paying a 
licensing fee and charging much higher prices than the foreign manufacturers 
who do pay the fees.150 
Advocacy groups have been calling for the CDC to leverage its patents for 
PrEP for the benefit of the American people.151  Specifically, the PrEP4All 
Collaboration (“PrEP4All”) has joined with the Yale Global Health Justice 
Partnership (GHJP) with a call for the CDC to force Gilead to pay a royalty and 
to use the proceeds to promote public access to PrEP.152  PrEP4All and GHJP 
have outlined several elements that should be included in any agreement 
between Gilead and the CDC: 
• Payment by Gilead of royalty revenues not just for future use of the 
CDC’s patents for PrEP but also for past infringement. 
• A licensing structure under which Gilead continues to pay royalties, 
even in the event that Gilead obtains FDA approval for PrEP with a 
newer branded product, Descovy (emtricitabine and tenofovir 
alafenamide) tablets. 
• A bar prohibiting Gilead from increasing the price of Truvada or 
Descovy as a result of the licensing agreement. 
• Transparent payment of royalties by Gilead and transparent 
investment of the royalty revenue by CDC. 
 
 144. Morten, supra note 141, at 7. 
 145. Id. 
 146 Ed Silverman, AIDS activists skewer CDC for conflicting stance on collecting HIV drug 
royalties, (Apr. 10, 2019), http://web.archive.org/web/20190411172712/https://www.statnews.
com/pharmalot/2019/04/10/aids-cdc-hiv-patents-royalties/. 
 147. Complaint at 57, United States v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 1:19-cv-02103-UNA (D. Del. 
filed Nov. 6, 2019). 
 148. Ed Silverman, supra note 146. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id.; see also Luthra, supra note 132. 
 151. GHJP Joins PrEP4All in Calling on CDC to Use Its Patents for PrEP, supra note 134. 
 152. Id. 
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• Use of CDC’s royalty revenue to fund “wrap-around” services and 
programs, such as laboratory tests and clinical care, that enable 
vulnerable Americans to access PrEP. 
• Provision by the CDC of low-cost PrEP, whether low-cost branded 
Truvada or a generic alternative, to public health programs and 
clinics serving vulnerable communities.153 
A March 2019 Washington Post article highlighted some of the reasons why 
the government has been slow to aggressively act against Gilead for 
infringement.154  After years of collaboration, an interdependence has developed 
between government research and private drug companies.155  The government 
historically has sought to encourage commercialization of its research, not stifle 
the dissemination of new medical breakthroughs by bringing patent 
infringement lawsuits.156  While the companies may be making a profit, at the 
end of the day they are producing lifesaving drugs on which millions of 
Americans rely.  Importantly, however, it should be noted that the government 
routinely licenses these discoveries.157 
President Trump announced in his 2019 State of the Union address a goal of 
eradicating HIV/AIDS by 2030.158  Dr. Anthony Fauci of the National Institute 
of Allergy and Infectious Diseases later elaborated that the administration would 
rely on two strategies to accomplish this goal: “antiretroviral medications and 
the increased use of preventative drugs”, e.g., Truvada for PrEP.159  President 
Trump subsequently called for $291 million dollars in his proposed 2020 budget 
to fund the initiative, $140 million of which would go, in part, to providing 
treatment and medications used for PrEP.160  This represents an eighteen percent 
increase in the CDC’s HIV prevention funding above the previous fiscal year.161  
It is important to note that in addition to concerns over drug prices, education 
 




 154. Rowland, supra note 98. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. In State of Union, Trump Announces Plan to Target HIV Hot Spots in Ambitious Goal to 
Reduce New Infections, KHN MORNING BRIEFING (Feb. 6, 2019), https://khn.org/morning-
breakout/in-state-of-union-trump-announces-plan-to-target-hiv-hot-spots-in-ambitious-goal-to-
reduce-new-infections/. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Lena H. Sun, Trump budget calls for $291 million to fund HIV initiative, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2019/03/11/trump-budget-calls-million-
fund-hiv-initiative/. 
 161. Id.; CDC HIV Prevention Funding, FY 1981 – FY 2020 Budget Request (BR), KAISER 
FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.kff.org/hivaids/slide/cdc-hiv-prevention-funding-fy-
1981-fy-2020-budget-request-br/. 
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programs for both patients and healthcare providers are equally critical in the 
overall effort to end the HIV/AIDS epidemic.  For example, the American South 
had 20,000 new HIV diagnoses in 2017 — more than the remaining regions of 
the United States combined.162  A combination of “stigma, poverty, inadequate 
access to health care and lingering racial bias” is to blame for this surprising 
statistic.163  Still, the issue of education and awareness is directly linked to drug 
prices.  For example, Virginia Medicaid pays $54.04 per pill (over $1600 per 
month) of Truvada.164  That takes away from the funding available to provide 
the educational programming necessary for outreach.  Even President Trump’s 
$291 million dollars in allocated funding comes as part of an overall package 
that reduces total funding to Medicaid.165 
For its part, Gilead makes several contentions in rebuttal, namely that the 
government’s PrEP patents are either invalid or at least do not reflect Gilead’s 
own contributions to the research, and that Gilead has been active in finding 
solutions to high prices and other barriers to widespread PrEP usage in high-risk 
populations.166  Gilead points out that they offer discount coupons for uninsured 
patients to reduce their monthly costs, and that it has spent almost $140 million 
dollars since 2012 on grants and programs to promote education and raise 
awareness.167 
II.  A WAY FORWARD: QUESTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The government’s recent action to sue Gilead for infringement raises several 
questions.  Assuming the patent is valid, what kind of damages can the 
government expect to recover?  Will it be enough to make a meaningful impact 
in the fight against the HIV/AIDS epidemic, either by funding the purchase of 
Truvada for usage as PrEP or by establishing enough education and outreach 
programs to make a meaningful difference?  If so, what kind of impact could be 
expected on the relationship between the CDC and drug manufacturers which 
have previously worked together in partnership?  In other words, if the 
government were to win the suit, would it result in pharmaceutical companies 
being less willing to market potentially life-saving drugs to new consumers, 
ultimately slowing progress in health research and discovery?  And finally, does 
this challenge put the entire government-owned patent paradigm under a 
spotlight that might expose the entire system to accusations of 
unconstitutionality? 
 
 162. Lenny Bernstein, This HIV pill saves lives. So why is it so hard to get in the Deep South?, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/this-hiv-
pill-saves-lives-so-why-is-it-so-hard-to-get-in-the-deep-south/2019/03/11/a221a784-354a-11e9-
854a-7a14d7fec96a_story.html. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Rowland, supra note 98. 
 165. Bernstein, supra note 162. 
 166. Rowland, supra note 98. 
 167. Id. 
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The 1947 Department of Justice report warned against the concern of double 
billing taxpayers — once for the research, and again to buy the fruits of that 
research.168  This is a crucial component of the argument that advocacy groups 
make to encourage the government to engage in enforcement actions against 
Gilead — that the taxpayer has paid for the research that discovered PrEP and 
pharmaceutical companies (like Gilead) unjustly reap the benefit of that taxpayer 
investment.169  Title 35 of the United States Code specifically states that it is the 
“objective of Congress to use the patent system to promote the utilization of 
inventions arising from federally supported research or development[.]” 170  
However, this comes with the crucial caveat that the patent system also “meet 
the needs of the Government and protect the public against . . . the unreasonable 
use of inventions[.]”171 
If the government prevails in its suit and is able to extract damages and fees 
from Gilead, that money could be used for lifesaving programs and medications.  
This also means that in some ways the patent system remains virtually 
unscathed: a party who infringes upon a patent is liable for damages.  There is 
certainly room for the argument that the government should be treated as a 
private patent holder, and that the “government-owned” aspect doesn’t impact 
whether or not a valid patent was infringed.  However, the reality is that the 
government as a patent owner is unique.  Were the government to act on its 
patents to exclude others, they could be defeating the purpose sought by our 
country’s Framers of promoting progress and the advancement of society.172 
In truth, the relationship between government health research and private 
pharmaceutical companies is a well-established relationship.  It has only been 
recently, with enormous spikes in drug prices, that public outrage has led to a 
close examination of this system.  This might suggest that if the government 
were to disturb the system by suddenly taking patents on offense, the 
relationship could become seriously unbalanced.  A disruption could result in 
negative health outcomes for millions of Americans across a broad range of 
health issues, from high blood pressure to cancer.  However, if the current 
system is no longer working, a realignment of the relationship may be necessary 
for long-term benefits and for the advancement of health research into the future. 
Finally, by taking a protective stance over its patent collection, the 
government is in effect removing publicly funded inventions from the reach of 
the public.  However, as shown by the fact that the CDC routinely licenses its 
patents for nominal fees, 173  it seems unlikely that any seismic shift in the 
landscape would result.  The key is in crafting a licensing agreement that 
encourages companies to be reasonable in their pricing schemes while also 
 
 168. Lerner, supra note 47, at 1853; see infra Sec. I.D. 
 169. Our Story, PREP4ALL, https://www.prep4all.org/our-story (last visited March 17, 2021). 
 170. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (emphasis added). 
 171. Id. 
 172. See infra Sec. I.F. 
 173. See infra Sec. I. 
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ensuring that the public is not unfairly charged for inventions and discoveries 
for which they have already paid.  It is a novel idea for the government to wield 
its patent estate for public policy goals, but one that has enormous potential.  If 
the government prevails in its suit against Gilead, it is almost guaranteed that we 
would see more of these actions in the future.  Such power is also rife with 
potential for abuse, and advocates should be mindful that if the government 
succeeds in this case it will theoretically have the power to selectively withhold 
licenses from certain individuals in the name of policy goals.  As the guiding 
ideology of our political system is subject to change every two to four years, the 
possibility of corruption and uncertainty could have a net negative effect on 
progress in various fields of study. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The government is one of the largest owners of United States patents, yet 
surprisingly does not often sue private parties for infringement.  One reason for 
this is that the legality of the patent estate remains somewhat unsettled.  Issues 
stemming from the language of the Constitution itself underlie concerns ranging 
from contract theory to untenable public policy positions.  More obviously, 
however, there simply hasn’t been occasion for any court to consider the issue.  
This may change, however, if the government prevails in its first-of-its-kind suit 
against Gilead.  Ultimately, it remains to be seen how the courts will treat a 
challenge brought by the government for infringement, but surely these issues 
and more will inform the court’s thinking and possibly even its decision. 
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